Apr

15

From Easan Katir:

The Hall of Uselessness: Collected Essays, by Simon Leys.

Simon Leys is a Renaissance man for the era of globalization. A distinguished scholar of classical Chinese art and literature and one of the first Westerners to recognize the appalling toll of Mao’s Cultural Revolution, Leys also writes with unfailing intelligence, seriousness, and bite about European art, literature, history, and politics and is an unflinching observer of the way we live now.

From Zubin Al Genubi:

Pathogenesis: History of the World in Eight Plagues, by Jonathan Kennedy.

According to the accepted narrative of progress, humans have thrived thanks to their brains and brawn, collectively bending the arc of history. But in this revelatory book, Professor Jonathan Kennedy argues that the myth of human exceptionalism overstates the role that we play in social and political change. Instead, it is the humble microbe that wins wars and topples empires.

From Asindu Drileba:

Math Without Numbers, by Milo Beckman.

Math Without Numbers is a vivid, conversational, and wholly original guide to the three main branches of abstract math—topology, analysis, and algebra—which turn out to be surprisingly easy to grasp. This book upends the conventional approach to math, inviting you to think creatively about shape and dimension, the infinite and infinitesimal, symmetries, proofs, and how these concepts all fit together. What awaits readers is a freewheeling tour of the inimitable joys and unsolved mysteries of this curiously powerful subject.

Peter Ringel is watching:

Voltaire: The Rascal Philosopher

I discovered a terrible knowledge gap and missed details of a great one. so many angles to be impressed. his writings seem to be the least of it. he even gamed the king's lottery and won with a group of investors & mathematicians.

William Huggins suggests a somewhat older work:

A General History of The Most Prominent Banks, by Thomas H. Goddard, published in 1831.

its dry - but if you are interested in the 1819 panic, there are some good details. the book is mistitled imo as 3/4 of its pages and 2/3 of its text centers on the history of central/national banking in the united states from 1786 through 1831 (publication). on titular matters, it had a couple of interesting tidbits on the bank of genoa and some "interesting" statistical information for archivists but there are better modern sources on major banks in venice, the netherlands, england, and france (for example, the author skips over how the bankers of geneva funded the french revolution to knock the bank of genoa off its perch, etc). i suspect such deficiencies are because the text was designed as ammo in the "bank wars" of the early 1830s rather than a deep exposition on titular topics.

its exposition on us matters feels remarkably haphazard, i presume because the author's intended audience would have the context to appreciate why it includes what it does, including a description of the bank of north america, hamilton's report to congress on the need for a bank, and a brief on the First Bank of the US. where it begins to shine is in the next set of docs, which includes an auditor's report and statement by the president of the Second Bank of the US on how the panic of 1819 was navigated. it follows with mcduffie's 1930 report to congress on the SBUS (includes more details on the rise and fall of FBUS), and closes with a statistical archive of the "monied institutions of the US" and an appendix on how banking and commercial exchange granularly worked in the 1800s.

Stefan Jovanovich comments:

I was puzzled by the "decline and fall" description, since the Bank did not fail but simply had its charter expire without renewal because George Clinton did not like what Thomas Willing had done as President of the Bank. (Clinton failed to cast what would have been the winning vote for renewal.)

William Huggins responds:

"fall" referring to its near brush with survival, not any sort of mismanagement or fraud as in 1819. mcduffie describes FBUS as the victim of partisan politics, but one of such import that the same party who killed it started calling for a replacement almost immediately.

Stefan Jovanovich adds:

They wanted what Willing would not give them - a central bank that would do what the Fed does now - discount the Treasury's IOUs at par. Can't have a war without that.


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