Nov

17

FTX surprise

November 17, 2022 |

H. Humbert writes:

I find it amazing that an exchange with monopolistic market making, and no Manning Rule equivalent can ever lose money. As bad as stealing customer funds to cover trading losses sounds, I wonder if there's even worse to come because it sounds so incompetent. However, once again the value of crypto to nefarious actors is demonstrated by the 'asset classes' anti-fragility. Some flavor of the notion of honor among thieves.

Zubin Al Genubi replies:

Market makers can't handle big fast moves, of which we've seen some breathtaking one recently. I believe they are caused in part by the market makers and the ones who are just a bit slower get eaten by the lion. Of course this is sheer speculation on mu part.

H. Humbert comments:

With respect, your model of what a market maker is hasn't existed for about 15-20 years. Market making today is machine driven, speed of light kind of thing, and balanced/correlated across a firm's book. It is almost touchless for the most part.

So for example, if you are a Manning-Rule-free exchange, and you have your own internal market making operation that sees the flow first, you can, at the speed of light, see the direction of the order flow, front run it, sell into it, take the other side of the stupid trades ie the trades that are 'random' going against the flow that you are seeing, see the limit orders and the stop orders and run those etc etc. You see the flow first and decide how to execute against or with it or pass to the punters on the exchange.

It seems impossible to lose money at this and if you don't believe me, look at how few losing days Virtu and Citadel put up and they only get to see about 90% of just the retail flow in equities and they generally can't front run it. They can only decide if they want to take the other side or pass the order on to the market. Imagine if you had no fiduciary responsibility at all and no any kind of rule of best execution.

Anyway I go on and on, but point is, that FTX's Alameda lost money and a lot of it is very strange. Also, I should add, that I know absolutely nothing about crypto.

I can't help but notice that another of Vic's flags is prominent in this FTX story, and that's all the charity work they were doing. All while seemingly running some crazy embezzling thing to cover what? How were they generating these huge losses?

I knew a living human market maker at Schwab in the dot com era. His boss took and traded a single security(I won't name it) and split the rest of the book up. My living human associate got like m-z or something and one day he's long a zillion XLNX. Supervisor screams at him 'What are you and ANAL-IST?"–meaning what ever you think you know, get back to making markets and leave the positions to the buy side suckers. So maybe the losses are from directional market supporting efforts or some such.

Zubin Al Genubi suggests:

Maybe machine/com speed now determines winners?

William Huggins agrees:

can't see why that wouldn't be the case. on a precisely related note, a friend (ex-mit) gave a talk on algos in finance a decade ago, noting at one point how buildings were then being hollowed out to reduce microseconds of lag (i start the clip where its juicy).

H. Humbert writes:

This is one issue with co-location of servers at the exchanges, why it costs so much, why IEX markets a 200ms 'speedbump' to protect resting orders, why dark pools offer some very strange order types, etc etc but ultimately, the winners and losers imo, are determined by rent seeking in the regulations. Ban payment for order flow and Virtu disappears, ban internalization and Schwab has to charge commission, make best execution mean best possible all in price at the moment the order is received and all brokers will institute intermarket sweeps and order flow will go to exchanges, etc.

Stefan Jovanovich comments:

I hope H. Humbert will agree with this comment from the financial bleachers. The anti-trust laws, including agricultural marketing restrictions, have offered the same opportunities for rent-seeking around regulation without having any of the pushback from innovation - i.e. new and better ways to game the system. So, we have an age of inflation at the same time transaction and carry costs for retail customers have gone steadily down.

Duncan Coker writes:

This is a great description of the rent seeking infrastructure or "top feeders" as vic would say. It is all sell-side as that is where the stable income resides. Still as a lowly buy-sider if my choice is to get fleeced by the exchange/locals or the hft hedge funds I think I would go with the later. At least the hedge funds are competing against one other to steal from me. Don't even get me started with the wirehouses. Used to be 100 bp to execute/clear a trade back in the 80s, off exchange that is.

H. Humbert replies:

In the US equity world, which is the only thing I know anything about, the issue that that the HFT shops segment the order flow into smart and dumb and pay for the dumb order flow, which they get first look at and first dibs on off-exchange - through FINRA, which has it's own rules on order handling.

Segmenting the flow makes the rest of the market(not the internalizes, not the payment for flow(PFOF)), both lit and dark, more toxic in terms of adverse selection to resting quotes. This widens the spread, which makes internalization/PFOF more profitable - virtuous cycle kind of thing and also increases the concentration of who gets to see the flow first and decided where to fill.

Given the midterms, I think Chair Gensler has enough political capital to push through some of the rule changes he's been talking about: “Competition and the Two SECs” Remarks Before the SIFMA Annual Meeting

To me, the most likely significant change to get through easily is SEC's own Best Execution rule(amazing I know that there is none currently) and that could dramatically change where orders get filled. We'll see.


Comments

Name

Email

Website

Speak your mind

Archives

Resources & Links

Search