May

15

The bonds are down about 6 points in the last two weeks. Worse yet, those who bought at the auction a week ago, actually have a loss. There's a famous incident where a great cricketeer was up by 1 run, and then on the last pitch, he rolled the pitch to the batter instead of hurling it. The epithet "it's not cricket" is appropriate to the temporary loss that the flexions and colleagues at the bank have. One would imagine that the upside down man is persona non grata. But more important, who was the player that did the dastardly deed. One believes it was in the mid 70s the last time that the bonds discommoded the colleagues, but what was the team and the player?  

Can you top that? What is the most disgusting incident in the history of (the market) relative to Trevor Chappell rolling the ball you can recall in the market? Was it the mingling of funds without retribution by the Governor? Or the flash crash before the French Inside trading before Leeson announced? To me it was being blindsided by a high bid for bonds that I took from Michael Lewis's firm right before the flow of funds man announced his bullishness. What's yours? 

Update: A kind correspondent says it was Ian Chappell. Worse yet it was a game among the colonies, New Zealand vs. Australia. One can only analogize it to the IMF not being paid back first on account of a bad debt or a country in the EC defaulting on its debt. "It's not cricket". The rain in Brussels might preclude taking the mistress out for a fish dinner.  

Craig Mee writes: 

Victor,

Ian would gasp at being associated with this (as well as most of the nation)… his equally talented brother Greg Captaino instructed the third brother Trevor to do the dastardly underarm deed to "prevent New Zealand scoring the sux they needed to tie"

wiki the "underarm bowling incident of 1981".

Anatoly Veltman writes: 

I'm afraid to say: buying a single lot of SP futures near October 16th, 1987 close. On that triple witching Friday, which followed the relentless two-week decline, the floor rumor had it that one Palindrome had accumulated an outsized long position (the whisper number I heard was over 10,000 lots). I traded Gold and Silver, which closed an hour and half before the SP. Feeling lucky from my metal profits, I decided to take my first plunge into stocks. I thought to myself: if a trading legend is compelled to accumulate that much into this close, then this must be an exceptional value. Still, the novelty of buying stocks and the discomfort of taking a Long position period, made me limit my experiment to a single lot.

Well, as history books will tell you — Black Monday's opening gap down was the largest in all of the preceding stock index futures history! And wouldn't you know it: a very rare opening signal developed by an exclusive research group of like-minded younger traders stared huge in my face that morning. The signal had three conditions, and that's why it would occur so rarely:

1. If a market dropped big into the close AND

2. If the sentiment survey diverged (I.e. went up) AND

3. If a market subsequently gapped down big against such bottom-picker sentiment

Then you must SHORT that gap-down opening!!!What made my one-lot Long the worst position I've ever taken in my trading career was that instead of executing this rare Shorting signal of mine on that Monday morning - I had to digest my damning stupidity of following somebody else's silly Long of Friday. Another younger trader, who was not burdened by any silly Long, did execute the Shorting signal and doubled his Short position once the SP opened down around 260.00 and proceeded to plunge lower. Lo'n' behold, that day ended up printing 190.00; and the younger trader has become the Robin Hood that the community admires today…

anonymous writes: 

I worked for the 'Robin Hood' you mention in your comment below for 3 years.

Although quantitative types such as I believe that he is an example of survivor bias I must say this — I have never witnessed such ferocity, focus and ability to cut losses with alacrity as I saw him demonstrate time after time. (In all fairness I was not fortunate enough to work alongside the Chair at NCZ back in the day….)

A genuine trading talent.

Anatoly Veltman replies: 

Yes, and therein another lesson: that the "survivor bias" is not entirely random. Were you part of that Liberty Plaza office that sported the sign: "Maximize size, minimize risk!"

That particular trade carried the trademark of the genius: nimble lightly to Short a potential bubble over 330.00; adding substantial Short that melted the 300.00 phantom support a month later; and finally doubling up below the 260.00 where the black hole of no bids guaranteed the break of 200.00 before the bell could save the day!


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