Aug

22

How to Be a Good Intelligence Analyst
“The first to get thrown under the bus is the intelligence community”

Which blog recommends this book:

Analytic Culture in the U.S. Intelligence Community: An Ethnographic Study, by Dr. Rob Johnston.

[Dr. Johnston] reaches those conclusions through the careful procedures of an anthropologist — conducting literally hundreds of interviews and observing and participating in dozens of work groups in intelligence analysis — and so they cannot easily be dismissed as mere opinion, still less as the bitter mutterings of those who have lost out in the bureaucratic wars. His findings constitute not just a strong indictment of the way American intelligence performs analysis, but also, and happily, a guide for how to do better. Johnston finds no baseline standard analytic method. Instead, the most common practice is to conduct limited brainstorming on the basis of previous analysis, thus producing a bias toward confirming earlier views. The validating of data is questionable — for instance, the Directorate of Operation’s (DO) “cleaning” of spy reports doesn’t permit testing of their validity — reinforcing the tendency to look for data that confirms, not refutes, prevailing hypotheses. The process is risk averse, with considerable managerial conservatism. There is much more emphasis on avoiding error than on imagining surprises.

Stefan Jovanovich comments:

Actual military intelligence is never even allowed to be on the bus. The CIA's human analysts had an infallible record of guessing wrong about war that was matched only by Congress and the Pentagon. The odds are that Putin and Trump spent the time discussing what the Russian Army's actual capabilities are and what the Russians know about NATO's present inventory. The absence of any U.S. generals and intelligence professionals from "the meeting" is a pure tell.

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