Daily Speculations

May 4, 2003

 

Dispatch from Omaha

Day 2

By James Altucher

 

 

 

The meeting kicked off at 8am with a video, showing

among other things, a cartoon depiction of  The Wizard

of Oz  with Warren dressed as Dorothy, Munger as Toto,

and Bill Gates as the Wizard. Warren/Dorothy saves the

day by calling in a NetJets jet to take him back to

Omaha. The irony only becoming apparent later when it

turns out that NetJets was the only division in the BRK

empire Q1  03 to lose money (trips to Oz, I guess,

bleeding too much money. )

 

The official shareholder meeting lasted about 10

minutes. Directors were unanimously reelected, and the

one shareholder proposal (a request for the B

shareholders to be part of the charitable contribution

program of the As) was not even seconded by any of the

15,000 shareholders present so was not voted on. 10

minutes into the meeting Walter Scott (normally known

in his role as founder of Level Three Communications

which BRK invested 100M in this past year in a convert

debt deal) motioned for adjournment and the request was

granted.                       

 

Then the fun began. 6 hours of Q&A. The exact specifics

of which I completely forget. Suffice it to say it was

filled with a lot of plain talk, down-to-earthisms like

 if management doesnt want the reader of the 10K to

understand it, then something wrong is going on.  and

 I know people will be chewing Wrigley s gum and eating

Snickers bars 10 years from now but I have no idea what

will be happening in telecommunications.

 

In terms of the two questions I had coming into this

meeting I think I got some fairly clear answers. In

terms of the whether or not BRK is a buy or a short -

Buffett admits he would not recommend it. The risks are

pretty clear and are large enough to make me think the

upside is greater than the downside as a short:

 

 a. the Gen Re derivatives terrify him. Half the

meeting was about how bad derivatives are. Meanwhile,

he has been trying to unravel the 14,000 or so

derivatives with 600 counterparties that Gen Re dumped

on him. My worry is that either the derivatives cause a

problem (and the annual report suggests that the

counterparties may not be able to pay in some cases) or

the business fails to turn around, although to BRK s

credit, Gen Re did turn the corner and show a profit

this quarter.

 

B. In terms of a writedown of goodwill on Gen Re,

Buffett noted that he does not think goodwill should be

included in determining the intrinsic value of the

business. I m not an expert on the accounting issues of

this. My only concern is this was BRK s biggest

acquisition ever and goodwill does provide some clues

as to management effectiveness in valuing potential

acquisitions. A writedown of this size would not bode

well particularly since it would be balanced against

several years worth of earnings.

 

 

C. The company is definitely making a bet on a widening

lower class (the most recent acquisitions being Clayton

Homes, a provider of manufactured homes, and McLane

Distribution, a supplier of goods to convenience stores

and wholesale stores which Buffett just bought on

Friday from WalMart), greater unemployment, lower

interest rates, and a perpetually sluggish economy. The

primary assets of the company being fixed income bonds

that would be adversely effected by any rise in

interest rates. Munger s greatest fear, which he

brought up in the meeting, was a spiraling down dollar,

triggering perhaps government seizures of financial

assets  which we would not be able to protect against

for reasons I didn t really follow, not really knowing

anything about currencies or extreme paranoia. And

Buffett mentioned that although GDP growth appears to

have been 2% last year it was actually less because

 per capita GDP  was less since the population grew.

His theory being that we are still in a 2 year

recession.

 

D. The succession issue is never brought up except

jokingly. Anecdotally, most of the people I spoke to at

the meeting said they would basically sell the day

Buffett dies. I can t imagine who will be buying that

day and given the liquidity of the stock its not going

to be a peaceful fall.

 

E. All of the retail businesses are slowing and Netjets

continues to lose money.

 

Clearly Buffett has had some huge successes on the

investing side: Coca-Cola, Geico, American Express, and

Gilette being the largest examples. Although none of

these can be called Graham-Dodd style picks he clearly

waited for the fat pictches, buying great brands when

they were down and out and letting the bets ride. His

famous statements are to always  buy what you know  and

 buy businesses that will be here 20 years from now.

 

 Hard to argue but I m not sure Buffett really follows

those suggestions anymore (unless he s been living in

trailer parks and digging up energy pipelines). Most

recently he s been seen scooping up convert debt on

Amazon, Level Three and a host of heavily regulated

energy pipeline companies. Gen Re, which he knew better

than anyone, had massive problems after he bought it

and he had to replace top management despite his

protests that he likes to stay out of the way of

management.

 

My guess is that Buffett s current investing strategy

is as follows:  wait in my office until someone walks

in and hands me a lot of money for free.  For instance,

the SQUARZ bonds that Berkshire issued this past year.

Investors loaned him $200M AND pay Berkshire 1% a year,

resulting in the first ever negative coupon bond. All

this for the right to buy shares of BRK in 2007 at 90K

/ share. Would Buffett have taken the other side of

this deal?

 

Why doesn t he invest in technology companies? At this

point, no technology companies would want him to.

Almost every deal he does is with illiquid companies or

companies teetering on bankruptcy that cater to his

pawn-shop like demands for collateral and yield. Power

to him that he can get those deals, but they re not the

sort of deals that growing, healthy companies like EBAY

(which BRKa has underpeformed since its high in 1998)

need or want nor are they the sorts of deals which

other investors can hope to do in the safety of their

homes.  Already the large non-management investors of

his most recent deal, Clayton Homes, are complaining

that management screwed them over by selling out to

Buffett.

 

 Every investor does it, but Buffett s greatest skill

is talking his book and making it a Bible. The economy

is weak, nuclear attack can happen any moment,

Japan-style deflation is possibly upon us, the dividend

tax cut is evil (note that if the tax cut is approved

there will be more pressure than ever for Buffett to

issue a dividend), and ENERGY ROCKS! need to be

examined with great skepticism as to underlying agenda.

That said, when he wants to, 50 years of studying the

market does allow him to let loose with great

investment wisdom,. My favorite from the meeting:  The

only way to be loved is to be lovable.