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Department of Connections

From: Ross Miller
At: 2/22 12:45

This post is inspired by the ongoing efforts of Ed May and others to illuminate me on the game of poker.

1. Good traders run experiments on the market to paraphrase Dr. Brett. Such
behavior is a strong precondition to rationality as I used to say when I
was an academic. What's amazing is that governments and other bureaucracies
never behave this way. The feds pass laws and regulations on a grand scale
usually without testing them out first. (Doing a trial run of something is
rarely a way to test it out, it's a way of killing it while trying to
convince one constituency or another that one is doing something about the
problem.)

2. Good poker players run experiments on their opponents.

3. The countist/Sklansky approach to poker is to determine the value of a
hand by running massive numbers of computer simulations, usually consistent
with the axioms of game theory. This is not a real experiment, just as
poker with play money isn't real poker, or surveys aren't real data. The
simulation approach requires that the holder of a hand behave in a certain
programmed manner and the opponents react in a certain programmed manner.
Such exercises can be informative, but they are not worth putting a lot of
weight on.

4. The typical outcome of the simulation approach to poker is the creation
of a ranking of hands. A-A (pair of Aces) usually wins and A-K suited comes
next. There are players that think A-K suited is better than A-A. Are they
right?

5. Maybe. The thing is that A-A is a harder hand to play correctly than A-K
suited. Indeed, I would suspect that for most poker players, pairs,
especially 8-8 through J-J are the hardest hands to play correctly. Part of
this is because some of the seemingly good hands they easily make--iffy two
pairs and three-of-a-kinds--can lose in a large variety of ways. The bulk
of the misplayings of A-A involve not folding the hand immediately after an
unfavorable flop or later community card, especially with tight or easily
read opponent(s).

6. Solution: What hands you play should depend not on a table in a book,
but on how well you play in a given situation. That's why some players are
big into mediocre suited connectors (8-7 of the same suit, for example).
They know how to play them better than they can play some other hands. One
can make big money off of learning how and when to play hands that the
computer would consider particularly dubious, like 5-3 suited, a hand that
can do amazing things against A-A. Because it's important to limit your
losses with such probabilistically poor hands, position and blind/ante
structure matter even more than they normally do.

7. With suited hands, and remember pairs are never suited, it's easy to
develop reasonable rules of thumb of how much to spend to see a flop and
which flops to fold unless a good bluffing opportunity arises.

8. The thing one has to remember in poker that economists and psychologists
tend to forget is that your subjects have an incentive to deceive you (and
vice versa).